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CONFIRMATION OF NOMINEES TO THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT
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LINDSTÄDT****
In light of concerns that politics, philosophy, and ideology now dominate the federal judicial appointment process—a process that many claim
should emphasize ethics, competence, and integrity—scholars have offered
a range of proposals. A considerable number, though, aim to compel
elected actors to focus on the candidates’ qualifications rather than on
their political preferences.
Without taking a normative position on these sorts of proposals, we
demonstrate empirically that the process leading to the appointment of (at
least) Supreme Court Justices may not be the “mess” that the proposals
suggest. While it is true that U.S. Senators are more likely to cast votes for
nominees who are ideologically proximate to them, qualifications also play
a significant role in accounting for the choices Senators make.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate, the legal scholar
Ronald D. Rotunda declared that:
Our judicial system is at the top of the food chain, and that is a
good reason to leave well enough alone. Given the fact that the
Senate has been confirming federal judges for years, and the product is admired around the world, one wonders why we should
think of changing the way the Senate confirms.1

Without doubt, the vast majority of Rotunda’s colleagues—not to
mention many members of the Senate—would disagree. For at least
two decades now, they have deemed the federal confirmation process
a “mess,”2 “abysmal,”3 “broken,” “going in the wrong direction,”4 and
downright “disorderly, contentious, and unpredictable.”5 Of course,
pinpointing the precise cause of the “problem” has generated its own
share of controversies.6 But there does seem to be general agreement
that politics, philosophy, and ideology now dominate a process that
should emphasize ethics, integrity, and competence—and as a result,
the quality of our nation’s judiciary, along with its independence, has
suffered if not markedly declined.7
1. Ronald D. Rotunda, quoted in Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts on the Senate’s Role in the Nomination and Confirmation Process: Whose Burden?, September 4, 2001, published in 50 DRAKE L. REV. 511,
524 (2002).
2. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994).
3. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 301
(2004).
4. John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 184 (2003) (quoting Senator Dianne Feinstein).
5. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT
NOMINATIONS 6 (1994).
6. E.g., HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS 166 (1988) (claiming that the
“crusade” of conservative interests to “pack the courts with ideological zealots has induced
more rather than less partisanship” in the selection process); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 5, at
6 (asserting that the current state of the confirmation process reflects “profound changes in
American politics and institutions,” not the least of which is the “heightened activism of
the modern federal judiciary”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Confirming Supreme Court Justices:
Thoughts on the Second Opinion Rendered by the Senate, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 101, 117 (arguing that the problem is with the President’s failure to “seek[] more ‘advice’ from the Senate prior to a nomination,” which would keep the media and interest group campaigns
“within more tolerable bounds”); Jeffrey K. Tulis, Constitutional Abdication: The Senate,
the President, and Appointments to the Supreme Court, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1331, 1331
(1997) (suggesting that the problem lies with “[t]he altered relation of President and Congress in the appointment of justices of the Supreme Court”).
7. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 2; Choi & Gulati, supra note 3. On the other hand,
we hasten to note, there are at least a handful of scholars who disagree with the view that
politics is necessarily a danger to be avoided at all costs. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky,
Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003) (assert-
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In light of these concerns, policymakers, social scientists, and legal academics have offered a range of proposals aimed at refocusing
the spotlight on a candidate’s qualifications for office, rather than his
or her ideology.8 Some have suggested, for example, that while the
President should be free to consider any criteria he deems relevant,
the Senate ought to eschew detailed examinations of the nominees’
politics and philosophy.9 As Professor Douglas W. Kmiec recently told
the Senate:
My proposition is simple: the proper Senate inquiry of a judicial
candidate is demeanor, integrity, legal competence, and fidelity to
the rule of law. It is not partisanship or policy agreement. While
textually the Senate is free to inquire and to reject a nominee on
any ground—even a highly political, constitutionally problematic
one like the nominee’s views on outcomes in specific cases—it
should not do so. Undertaking to make nominees carry a type of
political burden of proof will over time merely invite a subservience of mind and personality that is contrary to an independent
judiciary.10

Others cast only a partial concurrence, asserting that both the
Senate and President should focus exclusively or almost exclusively
on a nominee’s “objective” or “technical” qualifications.11 Some even
ing that both Presidents and Senates have and will continue to make their nomination/confirmation decisions, at least in part, on the basis of ideology and that “[t]his is exactly how it should be”); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Democracy and Disagreement:
A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
35 (2002).
8. For lists of these proposals, see CARTER, supra note 2, at 187-206, and GEORGE
WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT
NOMINATIONS 214-19 (1995). See also infra note 11.
9. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S11,269 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1987) (statement of Sen.
McConnell exhorting his colleagues to consider only the fitness of the nominee); 133 CONG.
REC. S10,538 (daily ed. July 23, 1987) (statement of Sen. Dole urging the Senate to focus
on the nominee’s “ability and integrity”); John S. Baker, Jr., Ideology and the Confirmation
of Federal Judges, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 177 (2001); Richard D. Freidman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283 (1986); Stephen L. Martino, Note, Change on the Horizon: A Prospective Review of the Nomination
and Confirmation Process of the United States Supreme Court, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 164, 174
(2001) (asserting that many Presidents have “argued that appointments to the court are
largely the prerogative of the chief executive . . . . [They] have believed that minimal competency standards should serve as the Senate’s measuring stick and confirmations should
be free of partisanship and ideology.”); Randall R. Rader, The Independence of the Judiciary: A Critical Aspect of the Confirmation Process, 77 KY. L.J. 767 (1988-89); see also John
D. Felice & Herbert F. Weisberg, The Changing Importance of Ideology, Party, and Region
in Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 1953-1988, 77 KY. L.J. 509 (1988-89).
10. Douglas W. Kmiec, quoted in Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts on the Senate’s Role in the Nomination and Confirmation Process: Whose Burden?, September 4, 2001, published in 50 DRAKE L. REV. 511,
553 (2002).
11. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 2, at 178; HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES,
PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM
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go so far as to propose a “tournament” among judges of the U.S.
courts of appeals to ensure the selection of “effective” Justices,12 while
simultaneously reducing the “level of partisan bickering.”13
Without taking a normative position on these sorts of proposals—
or registering our complete agreement with Rotunda’s claim that
“[o]ur judicial system is at the top of the food chain, and that is a
good reason to leave well enough alone”14—we demonstrate empirically that the process leading to the appointment of (at least) Supreme Court Justices may not be the “mess” they suggest. In general,
we find that while it is in fact the case that U.S. Senators are more
likely to cast votes for nominees who are ideologically proximate to
them, it is also true that the nominees’ qualifications play a significant role in accounting for the choices Senators make.15 More specifically, we show that qualifications have a significant impact on Senators who are ideologically distant from a nominee. That is, while
Senators may very well support a politically akin candidate regardless of his or her professional merit—they also will cast a yea vote for
a high-quality nominee regardless of his or her ideology.
We develop these findings in four steps. In Part II, we briefly consider allegations about the growing role of politics and the concomiWASHINGTON TO CLINTON 328 (new & rev. ed. 1999). Senator Paul Simon, on the other
hand, supplies a list of criteria that he thinks ought to guide the President’s selection. See
PAUL SIMON, ADVICE & CONSENT 310-17 (1992). More generally, there are endless variations on proposals designed to reform the appointment process. One particularly prominent
set advocates an active role for the Senate in checking the President’s nominations (especially if they appear ideologically driven) or, at the very least, recommends that the President seek more advice from the Senate before he announces a nomination. See, e.g.,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985); Ginsburg, supra note 6;
Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional
Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1986); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988); William G. Ross, The
Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28
WM. & MARY L. REV. 633 (1987); Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public:
To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1213 (1988).
12. Choi & Gulati, supra note 3, at 299.
13. Id. at 301-02.
14. In fact, reasons exist to believe that our system is not “at the top of the food chain.”
See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity 94 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) (asserting that the Canadian Supreme Court “is rapidly becoming one of the most influential courts worldwide on human rights issues” because of its
“active” participation in global judicial networks). Along similar lines, see Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Courting the World: U.S. Judges Must Overcome a Culture of Legal Isolationism—
or Risk Being Left Behind, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar. 1, 2004, at 78 (claiming that “[b]y exchanging views, sharing expertise, and citing each other’s opinions, judges around the world are
cobbling together a global legal structure—one the United States ignores at its peril”).
15. We are not the first to make this claim. See Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate
Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525
(1990); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents,
Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96
(1992). The conclusions we reach in this Essay flow from our efforts to adapt, refine, and
extend the 1990 article.
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tant declining role of qualifications in the appointment of Justices.
Part III describes the statistical model we deploy to assess the role of
ideology versus qualifications in the Senate’s decision over Supreme
Court nominees. Because the measures we invoke to animate the
concepts of “ideology” and “qualifications” are crucial to the credibility of our modeling exercise, we describe them in some detail. Next,
in Part IV, we turn to the results yielded by our statistical analysis;
in particular, we examine the substantive effects of ideology and of
qualifications on the votes of individual Senators. Since that analysis, as we foreshadow above, underscores the importance of qualifications for a seat on the Supreme Court, our findings deserve some attention in light of existing proposals to change how the United States
appoints its judges. We take up this matter in Part V.
II. THE CONFIRMATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: POLITICS
VERSUS QUALIFICATIONS
Academics and policymakers alike have expressed a number of concerns over the process by which Supreme Court Justices attain their
seats on the bench.16 But one concern rising above nearly all others centers on the increasingly politicized nature of the process. In some of this
commentary, the focus is on the role of organized interests and the media. Silverstein summarizes their influence by stating that “[t]he harsh
reality . . . that modern interest group and media politics shape the selection of judges to our highest courts . . . has provoked a good deal of
concern on the part of politician and citizen alike, and calls for the reform of the process of ‘advice and consent’ are frequently heard.”17 In
other investigations elected actors move to center stage. Schwartz, for
example, has argued that “[a]lthough partisan politics are inevitable to
some extent, such considerations . . . [until the 1980s] played a very minor role in lower court appointments and only a slightly greater role in
Supreme Court nominations.”18 Carter, too, agrees that the process is
now overtly and overly politicized, but he emphasizes ideology rather
than “party labels”: “Litmus tests,” he writes, “became far more important [during the Reagan and Bush I administrations]—and far more
consistent—than at any time in the past.”19
Has the process, in fact, grown more political in any or all of these
ways? If we focus exclusively on the amount of media and interest group
attention to nominations, the answer is undoubtedly yes. Consider, for
example, Figure 1, infra, which shows the number of groups supplying

16. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 11; CARTER, supra note 2; Choi & Gulati, supra
note 3; Ginsburg, supra note 6.
17. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 164.
18. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6.
19. CARTER, supra note 2, at 71.
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oral or written testimony for or against each nominee since Earl Warren.20 Even though the most recent nominees (Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer) failed to generate substantial interest group opposition (or support) relative to other recent nominees, the data overall evince a clear
upward trend: A simple bivariate regression shows that with each passing nomination since Warren’s, 1.23 more groups participated.21
FIGURE 1
NUMBER

OF INTEREST GROUPS PRESENTING

ORAL OR WRITTEN TESTIMONY FOR OR AGAINST
EACH NOMINEE FROM

BADER GINSBURG.22

EARL WARREN

TO

RUTH

20. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 361 (3d ed. 2003).
21. Although we should not put much weight on a bivariate regression, the results are
as follows (** indicates p ≤ .001):
VARIABLE
Counter
Intercept
N
R2
F(1,24)
Id.

COEFFICIENT
1.232**
-4.557

(STANDARD ERROR)
(0.282)
(4.351)

26
0.444
19.13

22. Id. Warren was nominated in 1953 and confirmed in 1954; Kennedy was nominated in 1987 and confirmed in 1988. Note that we do not include Homer Thornberry or
Douglas Ginsburg because those nominations were withdrawn before any Senate action.
The Fortas nomination (for Chief Justice in 1968) was also withdrawn, but only after a
Senate vote to end a filibuster failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority.
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However intriguing the data may be, it represents but the tip
of the iceberg. The data captures only activity that occurs in public
view—and on the floor of the Senate—when we know interest
groups regularly lobby behind the scenes, whether in the corridors
of Congress or on the pages of The New York Times.23 But even
with this limitation it would be hard to argue that the data displayed in Figure 1 fails to support Caldeira and Wright’s astute
observation:
[T]he selection of [Supreme Court Justices]—once a “cozy triangle” of senators, the executive branch, and the bar—has became a
major arena for the participation of interest groups . . . . What is
more, despite changes in administration, the broad participation
of organized interests and the battle lines drawn in the 1980s
over the politics of judicial nominations [persist].2423

Conveying a similar message about the increasingly politicized environment surrounding the appointment process are the data in
Figure 2, infra. There we illustrate the increase in media coverage
of individual nominations over time, with the dots indicating the
precise magnitude of the growth (for example, Justice Ginsburg’s
appointment in 1994 generated 49 more stories [in The New York
Times and Time magazine] than did her predecessor, Byron White’s
about three decades earlier, in 1962). Note that in every instance
the successor nominees received more coverage than their predecessors and that overall, The New York Times and Time magazine published 358 more stories about the post-1980 nominees, for a mean
change of 51.14.

23. Indeed, one study estimates that at least 150 organizations participated in one
way or another in the Bork nomination, David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Counteractive Lobbying, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 25, 35 (1994), while just thirty-eight provided testimony.
24. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: The Rise of Organized Conflict in the Politics of Federal Judgeships, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 44-45 (Lee
Epstein ed., 1995). Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that while interest group participation in nominations is on the upswing, it is “not an entirely new phenomenon,” as Yalof
points out. “Organized interests,” he continues, “figured significantly in defeating Stanley
Matthews’s nomination to the Court in 1881. Almost fifty years later, an unlikely coalition
of labor interests and civil rights groups joined together to defeat the nomination of John
Parker.” DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES 16 (1999) (footnote omitted); see also
Caldeira & Wright, supra, at 47-50.
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FIGURE 2
CHANGE (INCREASE)

IN THE NUMBER OF STO-

RIES PUBLISHED IN THE NEW

TIME

YORK TIMES AND

MAGAZINE FROM NOMINEES APPOINTED

SINCE 1980 AND THEIR PREDECESSORS.2524

These data lend some support to those who argue that the environment surrounding Senate contemplation of Supreme Court nominees has grown increasingly political and highly charged. But the
more relevant question is the extent to which U.S. Senators are political in response. Do Senators’ votes, in other words, attend to ideological and partisan-political concerns rather than to a candidate’s
qualifications to serve on the high Court?
The answer, according to much of the existing commentary,26 is
yes. As Watson and Stookey write, a common complaint about the
process is that “voting of the Senate has reflected political motives
and ignored whether in fact the nominee is qualified.”27 Carter, the
author of The Confirmation Mess, surely concurs,28 as does Silverstein:
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine prominent members of
one political party today championing the nomination of a member
25. The source of this data is RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE
SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS (2005).
26. Exceptions here include Cameron et al., supra note 15; Segal et al., supra note 15.
In Part IV we refine and update the Cameron analysis.
27. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 8, at 214.
28. See CARTER, supra note 2.
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of the opposition to the Supreme Court, and the notion that a
president might be constrained to seek only nominees of stature
and prominence is simply too fanciful to be seriously entertained.
That a Democratic nominee with the long public career and the
controversial publications of a [Benjamin] Cardozo could be nominated by a Republican president and confirmed by a voice vote of a
Republican-controlled Senate, all within a period of ten days, is itself beyond modern comprehension.29

This is but a sampling of the conventional wisdom regarding the
triumph of politics over credentials in the confirmation process;
other exemplars would hardly be difficult to unearth.30 Nor, we
hasten to note, would it be difficult to locate social science evidence supporting these beliefs. From their analyses of seven
nominations—Fortas (1968), Haynsworth, Carswell, Rehnquist
(1971), Rehnquist (1986), Bork, and Thomas—Watson and Stookey
claim that they can accurately predict 81.43% (n = 643) of the approximately 700 votes cast based solely on the ideology and political party affiliation of the Senators.31 Massaro, in a study of the
failed Fortas, Haynsworth, and Carswell nominations, goes even
further—parsing the effect of the Senators’ ideology and partisanship on their roll call votes. At the end of the exercise, Massaro
concludes that “[i]n all three nominations, ideology is indicated to
be a more convincing factor than party affiliation in explaining
Senate voting on the Fortas cloture roll call and on the
Haynsworth and Carswell nominations.”32
III. QUALIFICATIONS AND THE CONFIRMATION OF SUPREME COURT
NOMINEES: OUR STUDY
While these and other analyses seem to clinch the case—the confirmation of Supreme Court Justices is now much more about politics
and ideology than it is about integrity and ethics—they are not without their flaws. Most relevant is that the authors select only those
nominations that are controversial, thereby begging the question of
what factors, including (the lack of) qualifications, lead to controversy. It also is the case that the authors base their conclusions on
29.
30.
31.
32.

SILVERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 2.
See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 2.
See WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 8, at 185, 190.
See JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL: THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY AND
PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT IN UNSUCCESSFUL SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS 15
(1990); see also DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION
MAKING 106 (1976). Rohde and Spaeth conducted a similar investigation of the nominations of Fortas (for Chief Justice in 1968), Haynsworth, Carswell, and Rehnquist (for associate in 1971) and reached the same general conclusion: “[I]t is the degree of liberalism
of a senator and not his party affiliation which is related to his voting on nominations.”
Id.
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statistical models that take into account only politics and ideology;
they fail to attend to qualifications, along with other factors that may
affect the confirmation decision.33 As such, they cannot possibly assess the extent to which ideology, qualifications, both, or neither affect the votes cast by Senators. Making that assessment requires a
consideration of all the relevant factors simultaneously in one statistical model.34
To our knowledge, only one team of researchers has undertaken
this task—Cameron, Cover, and Segal in their 1990 article appearing in The American Political Science Review35—and it is that
team’s lead that we follow here. Momentarily, we unveil our plan
for so doing, that is, for refining and extending this classic study.
Here and now, though, we simply want to outline the underlying
logic of our (and the Cameron et al.) analysis. For starters, it is important to understand what we are seeking to explain, namely, the
votes cast by individual Senators over Supreme Court nominees
since Warren in 1953.36 These votes, in other words and in the parlance of social science, constitute the dependent variable in our
study.
Second, we attempt to explain these votes via three sets of factors, or independent variables: qualifications,37 ideology,38 and control variables.39 The first two—qualifications and ideology—
constitute the primary variables of interest; that is, we gear our
study toward understanding whether nominees’ qualifications,
their ideological proximity to Senators, neither, or both account for
Senators’ votes. Control variables are those that we also think
may affect confirmation votes, and therefore we must consider
them to avoid “omitted variable bias.”40 Here those variables are,
as they were in the Cameron et al. analysis, whether the President
is “strong” and whether the Senator is of the same party as the
President.41
33. For other problems with these sorts of studies, see Cameron et al., supra note 15,
at 526.
34. For more on this point, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 76-80 (2002). See also infra note 40 and accompanying text.
35. Cameron et al., supra note 15; see also Segal et al., supra note 15. However, here
we focus on extending and refining the earlier 1990 piece.
36. Warren was nominated in 1953 and confirmed in 1954. More generally, see infra
Part III.A for more information on Senate votes over nominations to the Court.
37. See infra Part III.B.
38. See infra Part III.C.
39. See infra Part III.D.
40. Epstein & King, supra note 34; GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994). Omitted variable bias occurs
when a statistical comparison excludes variables that are (a) known to affect the outcome
and (b) correlated with the explanatory covariate of interest.
41. Cameron et al., supra note 15.

2005]

THE ROLE OF QUALIFICATIONS

1155

Finally, we require a statistical method that enables us to estimate the effect of these independent variables on the dependent
variables (the votes of individual Senators). For the reasons we explain in Part IV, a maximum-likelihood probit model is ideally suited
for our purposes.
With our general plan outlined, let us now turn to the task of
fleshing it out by providing details on the dependent variable, the
independent variables, and our statistical model. We then, in
Part IV, turn to an inspection of the results yielded by our analysis.
A. The Dependent Variable: Confirmation Votes
The dependent variable of our study consists of the 2461 confirmation votes cast by individual Senators on the Supreme Court
nominees from Earl Warren, in 1953, through Stephen G. Breyer, in
1994.42 Of the 2461 total votes, 15.35% (n = 378) were cast against
the nominee and 84.65% (n = 2084) were cast in the nominee’s favor.
Since our website houses the vote data, along with all other variables included in this study,43 we merely summarize, in Table 1, infra, the aggregate votes for and against each nominee. Note that
most votes have not been close. Thus the mode of nay votes is zero.
On the other hand, a great deal of variation exists from nominee to
nominee, such that the number of nay votes on average is 14.81,
with a relatively high standard deviation of 19.94.

42. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records (Study No. 4), at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/00004.xml (last modified June 17, 2004).
43. Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to
the U.S. Supreme Court, at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/qualified.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2004) (providing data for this Essay).
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TABLE 1
S ENATE VOTES ON S UPREME C OURT
1953-1994. 44

NOMI-

NEES ,

NOMINEE
Earl Warren (CJ)
John Marshall Harlan
William J. Brennan, Jr.
Charles Evans Whittaker
Potter Stewart
Byron Raymond White
Arthur Joseph Goldberg
Abe Fortas
Thurgood Marshall
Abe Fortas (CJ)
Warren Earl Burger (CJ)
Clement Haynsworth, Jr.
G. Harrold Carswell
Harry A. Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
William H. Rehnquist
John Paul Stevens
Sandra Day O’Connor
William H. Rehnquist (CJ)
Antonin Scalia
Robert H. Bork
Anthony M. Kennedy
David H. Souter
Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen G. Breyer

VOTES IN FAVOR

VOTES OPPOSED

96
71
95
96
71
100
100
100
69
43
74
45
45
94
89
68
98
99
65
98
42
97
90
52
96
87

0
11
0
0
17
0
0
0
11
44
3
55
51
0
1
26
0
0
33
0
58
0
9
48
3
9

44. The letters “CJ” indicate the President nominated the candidate for Chief Justice. The vote on Fortas for the Chief Justice position was on cloture and failed to receive
the necessary two-thirds majority. Voice votes were taken on the nominations of Warren,
Brennan, Whittaker, White, Goldberg, and Fortas (for an Associate Justice position). Id.
The voice votes are treated as unanimous because there is no data on the counts. It is
worth noting that we reran the model presented in Table 2, infra, at p. 1168, without the
six “voice vote” nominees and all the variables continued to generate statistically significant (p < .05) coefficients (the p-value for Lack of Qualifications drops from .005 to .032,
and the p-value for Ideological Distance drops from .010 to .012). Also worth noting is
that Felice and Weisberg report that across four of the voice votes (Warren, Brennan,
Fortas, and Goldberg) there was, in fact, opposition from a total of (at least) seven Senators. Felice & Weisberg, supra note 9, at 515. Six of these seven Senators’ votes were
modified from yeas to nays (the seventh did not participate in the vote over the nominee
he apparently opposed), and we reran the model depicted in Table 2. Once again, all the
variables continue to generate statistically significant (p < .05) coefficients (the p-value
for Lack of Qualifications moves from .005 to .002, and the p-value for Ideological Distance moves from .01 to ≤ .001).
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B. An Independent Variable of Primary Interest: Qualifications
What the vote data reveals, to put it simply, is that while Senators
overwhelmingly vote in favor of confirmation (84.65% of all votes are
yeas), we could hardly deem decisions over Supreme Court nominees
consensual. In eighteen of the twenty-six cases, the nominee caused
some degree of division among the Senators. This is important for our
purposes, since without variation in votes, even limited variation, we
would have little to explain; we might well conclude that the Senate
merely supported (or opposed) the President’s choice.45
Since this is clearly not the case, let us now turn to the factors
that may explain the variation we observe, beginning with qualifications. As we have noted throughout, many would agree with Choi and
Gulati when they write:
[D]iscussion[s] [over Supreme Court nominees are now] almost entirely political (focusing on litmus tests such as a candidate’s likely
position on abortion). Occasionally, a nominee’s intellectual ability
is mentioned, but this topic has time and time again been placed to
the side in favor of a discussion of the nominee’s political beliefs.46

Choi and Gulati may be right in their characterization of the current
state of appointment discourse, but does that necessarily mean that
qualifications play an insignificant role (relative to other factors) in a
Senator’s decision to vote for or against a candidate, especially when
the Senator is ideologically distant from the candidate?
To address this question, we must develop a measure of “qualifications.” Given the disagreement among scholars and policymakers over
the characteristics that make for a “qualified” nominee, this is no simple
mission. Indeed, there are some who seem to argue that we ought to jettison it altogether. To them, attempts to devise “objective” indicators of
qualifications or merit are “doomed to failure” because “‘[q]ualifications’
always have been and always will be defined politically.”47
We cannot say we disagree, but devising a measure of merit based
on Senators’ (or even scholars’) colored definitions of merit is not our
project. Rather, our goal is to tap into the Senators’ or—more precisely,
assuming that Senators are oriented toward reelection—their constituents’ perceptions of whether a candidate is qualified or not. This
requires us to locate a measure of qualifications from sources external
to and independent of the Senate (and, of course, that is available and
observable prior to its vote).
45. But we could not, nor should we, eliminate the possibility that the President
nominated individuals he believed the Senate would confirm. See Byron J. Moraski &
Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional
Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069 (1999).
46. Choi & Gulati, supra note 3, at 300-01 (footnote omitted).
47. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 8, at 219.
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One measure that comes readily to mind is the Nominee ratings
produced by the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary. The ABA’s ratings are presumably
extrinsic to individual Senators, are announced prior to the confirmation vote, and, according to the ABA, are “impartial evaluations of
the integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament”
that “[do] not consider a nominee’s philosophy or ideology.”48 However, they are also problematic in any number of ways. One is that
the Committee’s rating system has fluctuated with time, and even
within particular periods it has lacked consistency. For example, until 1970 it typically rated a candidate as simply “qualified” or “unqualified.” In 1963, however, it deemed Arthur Goldberg “highly acceptable,” but the ABA thought it inappropriate to proffer “an opinion
to the degree of qualification.”49 Also problematic for our purposes are
allegations that ABA ratings evince a (liberal) ideological bias;50 that
bias may explain George W. Bush’s decision to end the Committee’s
“semi-official” role in conducting pre-nomination evaluations of judicial candidates, a role it has played since the Eisenhower administration.51
Given these concerns, we think it is best to eschew the ABA approach in favor of the one that Cameron and his colleagues developed
and used in their study of Senate votes: a measure of qualifications
derived from a content analysis of newspaper editorials written from
the time of nomination by the President until the vote by the Senate.52 Specifically, Cameron and his colleagues selected four of the
nation’s leading newspapers, two with a liberal outlook (The New
York Times and The Washington Post) and two on the more conservative end (the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times) and identi48. American Bar Association, ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, at
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/home.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
49. ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 25. For the language the ABA has used in its ratings,
see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 359-60.
50. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association’s Ratings of
Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1
(2001).
51. See Neil A. Lewis, Bar Association’s Role in Screening Federal Judges Is Reviewed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at A16. The Bush administration has denied this
charge, claiming instead, in a letter to the President of the ABA:
The issue at hand . . . [is] whether the A.B.A. alone—out of the literally dozens
of groups and many individuals who have a strong interest in the composition
of the federal courts—should receive advance notice of the identities of potential nominees in order to render prenomination opinions on their fitness for judicial service.
Neil A. Lewis, White House Ends Bar Association’s Role in Screening Federal Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at A13. Ultimately, the administration decided the ABA should not
receive advance notice. Id.
52. See Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 529-30. The same research team also used
the qualifications measure in Segal et al., supra note 15, and the scores are reported in
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 361.
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fied every editorial that offered an opinion on the candidate’s qualifications (from the nominations of Earl Warren through Anthony Kennedy). With the editorials in hand, Cameron and his colleagues coded
their content on the basis of claims about the nominee’s acceptability
from a professional standpoint;53 the research team then created a
scale of qualifications for each nominee that ranges from one (most
qualified) to zero (least qualified).54
Following procedures set forth by Cameron and his colleagues,
Segal updated their measure to include the four nominations subsequent to Anthony Kennedy, and we now display the results, the
qualification scores for all nominees from Earl Warren to date, in
Figure 3, infra. From the data it is easy to see why we and others
find this measure so compelling: it seems to have a high degree of facial validity; that is, it appears to comport with our existing knowledge of the nominees. Note, for example, that it is Carswell, reckoned
“mediocre” even by supporters,55 who receives the lowest score, while
it is Kennedy, Ginsburg, Scalia, and several others—that is, candidates even would-be opponents admitted were qualified to serve56—
who received the highest score.
53. To provide an example (one of which comes from our updating of the Cameron et
al. qualifications score), consider the following statement, which appeared in an editorial
about Ruth Bader Ginsburg in The New York Times:
The bridge she builds to justices like John Harlan, who served from 1957 to
1971, is a reminder of the mediocrity of so many appointees of the Bush-Reagan
years. Nominees chosen for ideology, or with sparse credentials out of political
necessity, by increments have depressed the Court’s performance, professional
standing and fidelity to law. President Clinton’s nominee brings a touch of class
to the Supreme Court.
A Touch of Class for the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, at E16. We coded this as a positive statement about Ginsburg’s professional qualifications.
The following, also appearing in The New York Times, would be a negative statement
about Clarence Thomas’s professional qualifications:
Believe him or not, nothing in this bizarre episode enhances Judge Thomas’s
qualifications, which were slim to start. Believe him or not, his behavior on the
witness stand does nothing to enhance those qualifications. Believe him or not,
to confirm him is to gamble.
If Judge Thomas were a brilliant jurist, a Holmes or a Brandeis, the gamble
might be justified. But Clarence Thomas offers no such brilliance, no basis for
gambling with the public’s confidence in, and the future of, American law.
Against Clarence Thomas: Even ‘Don’t Know’ Calls for a ‘No’ Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1991, at A24.
54. In our analysis, we use a nominee’s lack of qualifications, rather than his qualifications, as an independent variable. We derive the Lack-of-Qualification variable simply
by subtracting the Qualification measure from one.
55. Recall Senator Roman Hruska’s (infamous) defense of Judge Carswell: “Even if he
were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they, and a little chance?” LAWRENCE BAUM, THE
SUPREME COURT 47 (1st ed. 1981).
56. Note that these three run the ideological gamut from conservative to relatively
moderate to liberal, and yet all received the ABA’s highest endorsement: well qualified by
a unanimous vote. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 360.
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FIGURE 3
PERCEIVED QUALIFICATIONS OF SUPREME
COURT NOMINEES, 1953-1994.57 THE SCORES
RANGE FROM ONE (MOST QUALIFIED) TO ZERO
(LEAST QUALIFIED).

Facial validity, though, is not the only reason why we invoke these
measures in our quest to explain Senate votes for Supreme Court nominees. At least three others come to mind. First, the scores meet our
original criteria of being external to the Senate (it is newspaper editors
and not Senators from whom we derived the scores) and of being available and observable prior to the Senate’s vote. Second, the scores pass
standard criteria for intercoder reliability: using π as their index, Cameron and his colleagues report results of .87 (p < .001).58 Finally—and
perhaps not so stunningly, given the range of newspapers consulted—
the measure does not appear biased by ideology or political party; in
other words, neither liberals nor democrats receive higher (or lower) ratings based solely on their policy preferences or partisanship.59
Despite these advantages, at least one scholar has critiqued the ap57. The letters “CJ” indicate the President nominated the candicate for Chief Justice.
We do not include Homer Thornberry or Douglas Ginsburg because those nominations
were withdrawn before any Senate action. The Fortas nomination (for Chief Justice in
1968) was also withdrawn, but only after a Senate vote to end a filibuster failed to receive
the necessary two-thirds majority. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 361.
58. Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 533.
59. A bivariate regression of the qualification score on our measure of ideology (see
Part III.C) produces an insignificant coefficient (p = .136), as does a regression of qualifications on the nominee’s political party (p = .642).
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proach on the ground that it does not fit with his “conviction that the
measure of characteristics such as ‘qualifications’ or even ‘ideology’ is
never static but fluctuates over time in response to the political realities
of the day.”60 But because the measure is indeed dynamic in this way—
after all, its developers derived it from editorials contemporaneous with
the nomination—this is actually yet another benefit of, rather than a fatal flaw in, our approach to assessing a candidate’s qualifications.
C. Ideology
“Qualifications” is one of our variables of chief concern; the other is
ideology (or policy preferences). Specifically, in line with existing commentary, we expect that Senators are more likely to vote for nominees
who are ideologically proximate to them (or their constituents)61 than
they are for nominees who are ideologically distant, especially if the
nominee is not particularly well qualified.
To assess this hypothesis we require not one but two measures of ideology—the candidate’s and the Senator’s—as well as a method for comparing
the two so that we can calculate the distance between them. In what follows, we elaborate on these requirements and how we fulfilled them.
1. The Ideology of the Nominee
To assess the ideology of nominees, we must develop a measure that
is independent of judicial behavior (or at least independent of behavior
on the Supreme Court), that we can calculate for all nominees (thereby
eliminating, for example, votes cast or opinions written as a lower court
judge), and that we can observe prior to the Senate’s vote.
Since these are some of the very same criteria that guided our selection
of a measure of qualifications, it will come as no surprise that our measure
of ideology is quite similar to an ideological score developed by political scientists Segal and Cover from newspaper editorials written between the
time of nomination to the Supreme Court and the Senate’s vote.62
The procedures used by Segal and Cover to analyze the editorials are
virtually the same as those Cameron, Cover, and Segal invoked to create
their measure of qualifications, but here, of course, they focused their
60. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 5, at 5.
61. We do not attempt to separate a Senator’s personal ideology from that of his or her
constituents; rather, we rely on analyses of roll call votes in the form of NOMINATE scores.
For an effort to separate Senate and constituent preferences, see Segal et al., supra note 15.
62. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). Segal and Cover made use of the same four
newspapers as did Cameron et al. in developing the qualifications measure: The New York
Times, The Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times. Cameron et
al., supra note 15; see Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995) (updating the Segal and Cover scores to cover
the four most recent nominees: Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
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content analysis on ideology. As Segal and Cover tell it:
[W]e trained three students to code each paragraph [in the editorial] for
political ideology. Paragraphs were coded as liberal, moderate, conservative, or not applicable. Liberal statements include (but are not limited
to) those ascribing support for the rights of defendants in criminal
cases, women and racial minorities in equality cases, and the individual
against the government in privacy and First Amendment cases. Conservative statements are those with an opposite direction. Moderate
statements include those that explicitly ascribe moderation to the
nominees or those that ascribe both liberal and conservative values.63

Segal and Cover then measured judicial ideology by subtracting the
fraction of paragraphs coded conservative from the fraction of paragraphs coded liberal and dividing by the total number of paragraphs
coded liberal, conservative, and moderate. The resulting scale of ideology (or policy preferences) ranges from zero (unanimously conservative)
to .50 (moderate) to one (unanimously liberal). Figure 4 displays the
score for each post-1953 nominee.
FIGURE 4
PERCEIVED

IDEOLOGY OF

SUPREME COURT

NOMI-

NEES, 1953-1994.64 THE SCORES RANGE FROM ZERO

(MOST CONSERVATIVE) TO ONE (MOST LIBERAL).

63. Segal & Cover, supra note 62, at 559.
64. The letters “CJ” indicate the President nominated the candidate for Chief Justice.
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 361.
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These ideological scores have developed quite a following in the
social sciences, and it is not hard to see why. Just as the qualification
score appears facially valid, so too do the ideological scores. To be
sure, there are some exceptions (for example, Clarence Thomas
seems more conservative than his score), but overall the measure
comports with our impressions of those nominees who ascended to
the Court. William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, generally regarded as liberals, received scores of 1.00; Scalia and Rehnquist, generally regarded as conservatives, received scores of .00 and .05 respectively.65
For our purposes the scores’ degree of validity (and reliability)66 is
important, but they are also of Court behavior, available for all our
nominees, and observable prior to the Senate’s vote. In other words,
the scores fulfill just about all the needs of our research.
2. The Ideology of Senators
Assessing the ideology of Senators is not a particularly challenging task. For over a decade now, social scientists have invoked
NOMINATE scores or a variation of them (such as the ones we use
here, Common Space Scores)67 to measure the ideology of Senators.68 These scores result from subjecting congressional roll call
votes to a scaling algorithm designed to identify each Congressional member’s position in an ideological space.69 The first dimension coordinate (which we use here) typically picks up the liberal/conservative dimension of conflict in American politics and
65. In fact, scholars have found that the ideological scores provide a satisfactory
predictor of judicial votes. See, e.g., Segal & Cover, supra note 62; Segal et al., supra
note 62. Certainly they explain the votes in some issues better than they do in others.
See Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.
261 (1996). But overall, across a range of cases, they have above-threshold predictive
power. For example, for the nominees in our study who attained seats on the Court, the
correlation between the ideological scores and votes in civil liberties cases is .771 and for
economic cases it is .620.
66. Using π, Cameron and his colleagues report reliability results of .72 (p < .001).
Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 533.
67. Some scholars use the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) vote scorecards to
measure the ideology of Senators. But, because the ADA relies only on a subset (and a nonrandom one at that) of votes to compute its scores, we eschew this approach in favor of
NOMINATE scores, and specifically the Common Space Scores. We have several reasons
for taking this particular tack, most importantly because it provides us with scores for
Presidents, and we ultimately deploy those scores to derive Common Space Scores for
nominees. See infra Part III.C.3.
68. See Keith Poole, DW-NOMINATE Scores, at http://www.voteview.com/dwnomin.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005); Keith Poole, Description of NOMINATE Data, at
http://www.voteview.com/page2a.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) (describing differences among
the kinds of NOMINATE coordinates); see also KEITH T. POOLE AND HOWARD ROSENTHAL,
CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997).
69. All votes with less than 97.5% agreement are scaled, and all members who voted
at least twenty-five times in a given Congress are scaled.
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ranges from negative one (most liberal) to one (most conservative).70
Of course, our interest is in the ideology of the individual Senators who voted on Supreme Court nominees. But, for purposes of
illustration, we provide, in Figure 5, infra, a glimpse of the ideology of the Senate during the nominations under study here. Specifically, we depict the NOMINATE Common Space Score of the
median member of the Senate at the time of the confirmation proceedings from Earl Warren though Stephen Breyer.

70. We should note that by invoking these scores, we depart from Cameron and
his colleagues who used the ADA vote scorecards. See supra note 67. In computing the
ideological distance between the Senators and nominees, Cameron and his colleagues
compared, on the same metric, the Segal and Cover scores (their and our measure of
nominee ideology) and the ADA scores (their measure of Senate ideology). See Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 533. We, of course, use a different measure of Senate ideology (the Common Space Scores), and we take a different tack in computing the distance between Senators and nominees. See infra Part III.C.3. Nonetheless, we did replicate their model (using their measures but including the four most recent nominees)
to assess the compatibility of our approach and theirs. No major distinctions arose, as
even a quick glance at the table below and the one presented in Table 2, infra, at
p. 1168, would reveal.
VARIABLE
Lack of Qualifications
Ideological Distance
Lack of Qualifications × Ideological Distance
Strong President
Same Party
Constant

COEFFICIENT
-1.220**
-1.156**
-9.678**
1.020**
0.838**
1.774**

N
Log-likelihood
χ2(5)

2451
-461.347
1184.991

(STANDARD ERROR)
(0.257)
(0.251)
(0.954)
(0.117)
(0.105)
(0.110)

Probit estimates of Senators’ votes on Supreme Court nominees, using the Cameron et al.
approach (** indicates p ≤ .01).
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FIGURE 5
THE

IDEOLOGY OF THE MEDIAN MEMBER OF

SUPREME COURT CONEARL WARREN TO STEPHEN BREYER.71 THESE ARE (FIRST
DIMENSION) COMMON SPACE SCORES, WHICH
RANGE FROM NEGATIVE ONE (MOST LIBERAL)
TO ONE (MOST CONSERVATIVE).

THE

SENATE

DURING

FIRMATION PROCEEDINGS, FROM

Interesting, of course, is the disparate ideological conditions prevailing at the various nominations. Note, for example, the relatively
“friendly” environment surrounding the confirmation of Thurgood
Marshall: a liberal nominee (Marshall attains a perfect one (liberal)
score on Segal and Cover’s ideological scale) facing one of the most
liberal Senates in our database (a median Common Space Score of
-.1575). In direct contrast comes the conservative Robert Bork (a .10
on the Segal and Cover scale), who was forced to confront a relatively
liberal Senate (a median Common Space Score of -.0665).72
3. Comparing the Ideology of Nominees and Senators
Whether the hospitable political environment explains Marshall’s
success and the relatively hostile environment explains Bork’s failure
71. See Keith Poole, Common Space Data, at http://www.voteview.com/readmeb.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
72. The median Senate first dimension Common Space Score over all the nominations
is -.057, and the mean is -.033 with a standard deviation of .314. Id.
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remains an open question—and one that the forthcoming analyses
are precisely designed to explain. But, before we turn to those analyses, we have several more steps to take, including among the most
delicate: devising a method to compare the ideologies of Senators and
nominees so that we can compute the distance between them. Only
by deriving such a “distance” variable can we determine the extent to
which politics enters into the decisions of individual Senators.
This is indeed a delicate task in light of the measures we employ
to tap the preferences of these actors: the Segal and Cover scores for
nominees and the Common Space Scores for Senators. Because these
preference proxies are not directly comparable, merely subtracting
one from the other will produce a problematic measure of the distance between them.
We solve this problem by making use of the underlying logic of the
Cameron et al. analysis—which conceptualizes distance by squaring
the difference between the ideology of the nominee and the ideology
of the Senator—but we adapt it to our measurement strategy.73 Specifically, we arrive at a Common Space Score for each nominee so
that we can directly calculate the distance between his or her ideology and that of the voting Senators. (We derived the score by applying a linear transformation, which we generated by regressing presidential Common Space Scores on the Segal-Cover scores.74)
D. Control Variables
As we have stated throughout, “Ideology” and “Qualifications”
constitute our chief independent variables, but there are two others
that Cameron and his colleagues (and, indeed, any analysis of Senate
voting over Court nominees ought) take into account: the “Strength of
the President” and “Same Party.”75 The strength of the President cap-

73. Recall that Cameron and colleagues compared (on the same metric) the Segal and
Cover scores (their and our measure of Court ideology) and the ADA scores (their measure of
Senate ideology). Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 533; see also supra notes 67, 70. We would
be in error to do the same given our assessment of Senate ideology via Common Space Scores.
74. The specific steps we took are as follows:
We began by estimating a simple OLS regression model with presidential ideology
NOMINATE Common Space Scores as the dependent variable and the Segal and Cover
scores as the only independent variable. We included only those Presidents whose party controlled the Senate at the time of confirmation, under the assumption that such Presidents are
(relatively) unconstrained and thus able to appoint nominees who mirror their own ideology.
The OLS regression provided the following linear transformation to calculate Common
Space Scores for nominees from Segal and Cover scores: Common Space Score = 0.4401225
- 0.9148797 (Segal and Cover).
We then applied that transformation to all nominees to derive the Common Space
Scores. The (euclidean) distance variable was calculated according to the following formula: Euclidean Distance = (cs1 - cs_nom) (where cs1 is the first dimension Common Space
Score for Senators, and cs_nom is the Common Space Score for Nominees).
75. Cameron et al., supra note 15, at 530-31.
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tures the idea that some Presidents are simply in a better position to
attain approval of their nominees than are others. We attend to this
idea as did Cameron and his colleagues,76 with a variable that takes
on the value of one if the President’s political party controls the Senate and the President is not in the fourth year of his term of service.
Otherwise, the value is zero. The second control variable, which we
include for all the obvious reasons, indicates whether the President
and the individual Senator are of the same political party. If they are,
the variable is coded one. If they are not, the variable is coded zero.
E. Summary of the Model
To summarize, we argue that four factors explain the votes of individual Senators on nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court.
1. Lack of Qualifications: The lower a nominee’s qualifications (see
Figure 3),77 the lower the probability of a Senator voting in favor
of the nominee.
2. Ideological Distance: The further the ideological distance between
a nominee (see Figure 4)78 and a Senator, the lower the probability of a Senator voting in favor of the nominee.
3. Strong President: If a President is strong, the higher the probability of a Senator voting in favor of the nominee.
4. Same Party: If a President and Senator are of the same political
party, the higher the probability of a Senator voting in favor of the
nominee.
Given the way we code the variables, we expect the estimated coefficients on the first two variables to be negatively signed, and on the
second two variables, positive.
Finally, we incorporate into our model a crucial fifth variable—one
representing the interaction between Qualifications and Ideological
Distance. This enables us to determine the extent to which Senators
vote against unqualified nominees, who are ideologically distant from
them (as we might hypothesize), apart from any independent effects
the two variables may exert on that vote. For example, just as Republicans found President Clinton’s ethical failings to be far more serious
than did Democrats, we might expect liberals to be far more affected
by the charges against Clarence Thomas, and conservatives far more
troubled by the ethical allegations against Abe Fortas. Whether this
“conditional” response to a nominee’s professional integrity (or, more
pointedly, lack thereof) is the result of motivated reasoning, the psy-

76. Id. at 529-30.
77. See supra p. 1160 fig.3.
78. See supra p. 1162 fig.4.
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chological reflex that causes humans to believe those arguments they
wish to believe, or sheer hypocrisy is beyond the scope of this study;
we simply hypothesize that the data will indicate behavior consistent
with the response.
IV. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSES
Because the outcome of our dependent variable, a Senator’s vote,
is binary (yea or nay), standard OLS regression is inappropriate. Accordingly, we explore the effect of the variables on the vote choice via
a probit model, which we estimate using maximum likelihood.
Table 2 summarizes the results, which, all in all, appear satisfactory. Each coefficient runs in the right direction; each is statistically
significant at p ≤ .01; and none is trivial in size. We thus could say
much the same of our exercise as did the Cameron team about theirs:
“Judged by an array of statistical criteria, the model was very successful.”79
TABLE 2
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF SENATORS’
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES.80
VARIABLE
Lack of Qualifications
Ideological Distance
Lack of Qualifications × Ideological Distance
Strong President
Same Party
Constant
N
Log-likelihood
χ2(5)

VOTES ON

COEFFICIENT

(STANDARD ERROR)

-0.678**
-0.641**
-9.009**
0.900**
0.367**
1.507**

(0.239)
(0.249)
(0.920)
(0.103)
(0.089)
(0.094)

2461
-584.399
942.23

These basic results now noted, let us consider how they inform
the major concern of this Essay: the relative roles of politics and
professional merit in the confirmation of Supreme Court Justices.81 Beginning with politics, Table 2 tells us that the coefficient
produced by the Ideological Distance variable is negative and significant, indicating that, in fact, politics does play a role in confirmation proceedings: As the ideological distance between a Senator
and nominee increases, the probability of a nay vote increases. So
79. Segal et al., supra note 15, at 109.
80. ** indicates p ≤ .01.
81. Note that Table 2 displays probit coefficients, which are not as easy to interpret
as, say, OLS regression coefficients. Accordingly, in our discussion of the results here and
elsewhere, we transform them into probabilities.
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too, as we can see in the left panel of Figure 6, infra, this statistical finding is not, especially if we keep in mind that nearly eightyfive percent of all votes are “yeas,” without substantive import.
Figure 6, infra, demonstrates that the probability, across the
twenty-six nominees under investigation, of a favorable vote varies
depending on a Senator’s proximity to the candidate under consideration. When we set all other variables at their mean (or median
[in the case of variables that take on values of 0 or 1], except for
the interaction term), the likelihood, on average, of a Senator voting for a candidate is .235 when that Senator and the candidate
are ideological extremes (the black line). That figure increases by
a factor of 4.23, to .994, when they are at the closest levels (the
dashed line).
FIGURE 6
THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGY AND QUALIFICATIONS
SENATORS OVER SUPREME
COURT NOMINEES FROM EARL WARREN TO
STEPHEN BREYER.82 EACH CURVE REPRESENTS
ON THE VOTES OF

THE PROBABILITY DENSITY OF VOTING YEA ON THE
NOMINEE, ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNCERTAINTY IN
OUR ESTIMATES. ALL VARIABLES ARE SET AT THEIR
SAMPLE MEANS (OR MEDIANS) (FOR EACH PANEL,
THE VARIABLE ON THE X-AXIS IS INTERACTED WITH
THE SAMPLE MEAN OF THE OTHER VARIABLE). THE
LEFT PANEL SHOWS THESE PROBABILITIES FOR
IDEOLOGICALLY DISTANT NOMINEES (BLACK) AND
IDEOLOGICALLY PROXIMATE NOMINEES (DASHED);
THE RIGHT PANEL, FOR HIGHLY UNQUALIFIED
NOMINEES

(BLACK)

AND

HIGHLY

QUALIFIED

NOMINEES (DASHED).

82. We generated these figures using the program Zelig, Version 1.1-2 2004. See Kosuke Imai et al., Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software, at http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005); see also Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347 (2000).
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Nearly as important as the candidate’s policy preferences (relative
to the Senator’s), though, is his or her professional merit. To see this,
consider the right panel which demonstrates the probability of a
Senator voting for a nominee on the basis of the nominee’s qualifications. Notice that when a nominee is perceived as highly unqualified
(the black line) and all other variables are at their mean (or median,
except for the interaction term), the likelihood of a Senator casting a
nay vote is (1 - .75 = .25); that probability decreases 125-fold to (1 .998 = .002) when the nominee is highly qualified (the dashed line).
Figure 6 depicts the likelihood of a yea vote when all the variables
(except those of interest) are set at their mean (or median, except for
the interaction term). Also worthy of exploration are other possible
scenarios, such as the one we display in Figure 7, infra: when the
President is at his lowest level of influence because the Senator and
the President hail from different parties, the President’s party does
not control the Senate, or he is in the fourth year of his term of service (and all other variables are set at their mean or median, except
for the interaction term). Note, first, the effect of ideological distance
(depicted in the left panel): if the ideological distance is minimal (the
solid line), the Senator will still, in all likelihood, vote for the President’s nominee (.914 probability) even though the President is quite
weak. But the odds turn against the President (.025) when the Senator and the nominee are ideological extremes (the dashed line). Now
consider the near-parallel effect of qualifications (shown in the right
panel): Presidents—even those with severely limited political clout—
will have a far easier time attaining the confirmation of their candidate if Senators perceive that candidate as highly qualified (.915 for
the solid line) than if they do not (.161 for the dashed line).
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FIGURE 7
THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGY AND QUALIFICATIONS ON
SENATORS OVER SUPREME COURT
NOMINEES, FROM EARL WARREN TO STEPHEN
BREYER, WHEN THE PRESIDENT IS AT HIS LOWEST
LEVEL OF INFLUENCE.83 EACH CURVE REPRESENTS

THE VOTES OF

THE PROBABILITY DENSITY OF VOTING YEA ON THE
NOMINEE, ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNCERTAINTY IN
OUR ESTIMATES.
PROBABILITY OF A
WHEN THE

THE LEFT PANEL SHOWS THE
SENATOR CASTING A YEA VOTE

SENATOR

AND THE NOMINEE ARE

IDEOLOGICALLY PROXIMATE (THE BLACK LINE) AND
IDEOLOGICALLY DISTANT (THE DASHED LINE).

Taken collectively, these results indicate that both ideology and qualifications have a significant, independent effect on the Senate’s decision to confirm. However, it is the interaction between the two that provides the greatest explanatory power. Senators will most certainly vote for candidates who
are ideologically close and well qualified, and they also will almost certainly
vote against candidates who are distant and not qualified. And, yet, while the
odds are high that they will vote for an undeserving candidate who is ideologically proximate (for example, Southern Democrats and Clement
Haynsworth)—thereby underscoring the role of politics—it is also the case
that they will, under certain conditions, support a distant candidate if they
perceive that candidate to be highly meritorious (for example, Republicans
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg), thereby underscoring the role of qualifications.
Figure 8, infra, explores this relationship between ideology and qualifications. The left panel compares qualified candidates (the top vertical lines,
representing a ninety-five percent confidence interval) and unqualified
83. The right panel shows the probability of a Senator casting a yea vote when a nominee is
perceived as highly qualified (the black line) and highly unqualified (the dashed line). In both panels we set the President at his weakest: he and the Senator are from different parties and his party
does not control the Senate or he is in the last year of his term. All other variables are set at their
sample means (or medians) (for each panel, the variable on the x-axis is interacted with the sample
mean of the other variable). We generated these figures using Zelig. See King et al., supra note 82.
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candidates (the lower vertical lines, also a ninety-five percent confidence interval) over the range of the Ideological-Distance variable when the President is weak and all other variables are at their mean (except for the interaction term).84 The right panel is a comparison between ideologically close
candidates (the top vertical lines) and those that are distant (the lower vertical lines), over the range of the Lack-of-Qualifications variable.85 The results are intriguing and underscore the claim that a significant difference
exists, as indicated by the nonoverlapping vertical lines, between qualified
candidates and those less qualified in terms of their likelihood of attaining
a position on the Court, even at the lowest levels of ideological distance.
Candidates who are highly meritorious and ideologically proximate are virtually assured a position on the Court, but the probability of confirmation
uniformly decreases as the Lack-of-Qualifications variable moves from the
lowest (most qualified) to highest (least qualified) levels.
FIGURE 8
THE

RELATIVE

EFFECTS

OF

IDEOLOGY

AND

QUALIFICATIONS ON THE VOTES OF SENATORS OVER

SUPREME COURT NOMINEES, FROM EARL WARREN
STEPHEN BREYER.86 THE LEFT PANEL
(IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE) SHOWS THE PROBABILITY
OF A SENATOR CASTING A YEA VOTE WHEN THE
NOMINEE IS HIGHLY QUALIFIED (DARKER VERTICAL
LINES) AND NOT QUALIFIED (LIGHTER VERTICAL
LINES) OVER THE RANGE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL
DISTANCE VARIABLE. THE RIGHT PANEL (LACK OF
QUALIFICATIONS) SHOWS THE PROBABILITY OF A
SENATOR CASTING A YEA VOTE WHEN THE SENATOR

TO

AND THE NOMINEE ARE IDEOLOGICALLY PROXIMATE

(DARKER

VERTICAL LINES) AND IDEOLOGICALLY

DISTANT (LIGHTER VERTICAL LINES) OVER THE
RANGE OF THE LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS VARIABLE.

84. The pooled first difference mean (standard deviation) = -0.8073 (0.158).
85. The pooled first difference mean (standard deviation) = -0.7477 (0.1741).
86. In both instances the President is “weak” and all other variables are set at their
mean (or median, except for the interaction term). We generated these figures using the
program Zelig. See supra note 82.
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V. DISCUSSION
Virtually all contemporary writing on the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees has it exactly right: politics plays a critical
role. Our statistical modeling exercise leaves little doubt that Senators are more likely to vote for nominees who share their policy preferences; they also are more likely to support the candidates of Presidents who share their partisanship.87
But that same modeling exercise also leaves little doubt about the
crucial role of qualifications. Whether Senators perceive a candidate
as meritorious affects their votes and, indeed, exerts an effect nearly
as strong as ideological proximity. Hence, our results give some empirical teeth to Watson and Stookey’s assertion that the current “justices are [not] less well qualified on some objective measure . . . than
justices of the past.”88
Of course, this is not to say that the President always taps the
“most capable,” the “best qualified,” or the “most meritorious” person
at any given time to fill any given vacancy. It is possible that there
was someone in 1969 more qualified than Warren Burger to serve as
Chief Justice or more meritorious than was Stephen Breyer in
1994—to name just two of the twenty-six nominees we examined. It
is necessary, however, that any proposals to reform the process account for the chief lesson of this study: qualifications do not appear to
play a trivial role in the confirmation of Justices. This result, at the
very least, should be a cause for pause before we offer (and policymakers consider) schemes for abrupt change, such as a tournament
among judges, which may not only perpetuate perilous norms,89 but
also, by virtue of eliminating all but federal judges, eliminate the
“most capable,” the “best qualified,” and the “most meritorious” person from consideration for a seat on the nation’s highest court.90
87. See supra p. 1168 tbl.2.
88. WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 8, at 222.
89. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003).
90. This is not the place to conduct a detailed investigation of whether nominees with
or without prior federal judicial experience make better Supreme Court Justices. (For this
type of analysis, see Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law, On Tournaments for
Appointing Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 157 (2004).) However, it is worth noting that in a 1998 survey (the most recent we could locate) asking
scholars to rate the fifty-two Justices appointed in the twentieth century (from Holmes
through Breyer), only one appellate court judge (Harlan II) received an “excellent” rating,
even though there were plenty of potential candidates. Instead, the balance of the list consisted of the familiar “greats”: Holmes and Brandeis (tied for the first and second spots),
Cardozo, Brennan, Warren, Hughes and Black, Stone, Frankfurter, and R. Jackson. Michael Comiskey, Has the Modern Senate Confirmation Process Affected the Quality of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices? (1998) (unpublished manuscript), cited in ABRAHAM, supra note
11, at 372. Interestingly enough, as Professor Abraham notes, Comiskey answers his research question in the negative.
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